

Center for Information Technology - IRST

An Overview of Access Control in ST


Silvio Ranise


ranise@fbk.eu / http://st.fbk.eu/SilvioRanise



Access Control in the Security Puzzle









Access Control Mechanism





Access Control Mechanism





Security of Cloud-based and Service-oriented Applications and Infrastructures



Problems/Limitations/Difficulties



- Difficult to write policies that match designer intentions
- Required more than a simple grant/deny to maximize oran sharing of information while reducing risk of unintended disclosure
- Administration is complex and may give rise to safety problems



 Enforcement may become very complex in presence of computation-dependent authZ constraints



 Lack of a uniform framework encompassing policy design and enforcement





OpenServices
Smart Community



Difficult to write policies that match designer intentions




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
Passive Missile Defence (PMD) Scenario






Content-based Protection and Release






Content-based Protection and Release






Policy Management Life Cycle (1)






Policy Management Life Cycle (2)






The CPR Tool: architecture






The CPR Tool: architecture





Architecture of the NATO enforcement tool





Automated analysis of NATO policies



- SMT-based verification
 - Encoding of verification problems as logic problems
 - Theoretical: decidability of verification by decidability of logical problems
 - Practical: integration of state-of-the-art SMT solvers for scalability
- SMT-based enforcement
 - Enforcement of policies by translation to XACML



Administration is complex and may give rise to safety problems







Automated analysis of Administrative Policies




- Administration of policies in (extensions of) RBAC model by SMT-based model checking
 - Theoretical: decidability of safety wrt a FIXED
 BUT UNKNOWN NUMBER OF USERS
 - Practical: development of a scalable tool,
 COMPETITIVE WITH other state-of-the-art tools such as Mohawk, VAC, PMS
- Extensions to temporal RBAC model
 - First decidability result

ASASPTIME

- Scalable tool BETTER THAN COMPETITOR
- SACMAT paper shortlisted for best paper award

ASASPXL/ASASPTIME: architecture







 Enforcement may become very complex in presence of computation-dependent authZ constraints








Synthesis of run-time monitors: problem






- Two types of authZ constraints
 - Local: user can execute a task under a policy
 - Global: Separation/Bound of Duties
- Workflow Satisfiability Problem: ensure termination while satisfying both control and authZ constraints

Synthesis of run-time monitors: solution







 Lack of a uniform framework encompassing policy design, enforcement, and extensions such as purpose for privacy












ALPS: a uniform framework for reasoning and enforcing access control policies






- Intermediate language
 - Precise semantics
 - Expressive for encoding variety of policies
- Reuse of theoretical results (e.g., from planning) and available verification tools (e.g., model checkers)

ALPS will be used in SmartCommunity: OpenServices platform





- API-based service access
- Variety of authZ requirements
- Users becoming more and more important
 - Besides authZ also privacy constraints