

A MODEL THEORETIC APPROACH TO DIGITAL IDENTITY

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



Modeling identity in the physical /digital world

A basic calculus

An extended calculus (sketch)







Semantics: entity "#alice" is associated with entity "Alice Bell" via relation "name" and with entity "#MscEng" via relation "degree" (leveraging on RFD formal semantics: https://www.w3.org/TR/rdf-mt/)

Issues:

- mixing entities and attributes
- requires identifiers (even if W3C data model does not prescribe it)





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
An extended calculus (sketch)






physical binding (tattoo)


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







Not all attributes are equal: some are "singling out" attributes










Confirmation means are just special singling-out attributes attributes for which a binding to the real entity can be established.





Verifiable digital attribute-to-attribute binding

physical realm \rightarrow bindings mostly occur by documents

(= engraving the two attributes on a physical substrate)


digital realm \rightarrow binding mostly occur by having a trusted entity T vouching for the binding by providing an assertion: <a1, a2>_{vouched for by_T}

NOTE1: technically, the assertion may be made available as a signed file, as a record in a database, DLT, through a digital service on a secure channel...) NOTE2: <a1, a2>_{vouched for by_T} is different from <a2, a1>_{vouched for by_T}



MODELING DIGITAL IDENTITY

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An attribute is a couple a=<tag, value> --- syntactic sugar: a=tag:value

tag belongs to a space of attribute names, value belongs to the space of the respective values. E.g.

a1=name:John

a2=height:178

a3=pub_key:3f3dhc7css8b2323fe

The tag provides the semantics of the attribute, and may help the verifier to decide whether to treat it as a confirmation mean, an identifier, its format, unit, etc. As a matter of fact, there is need for a standardized ontology of tags to establish a shared semantics.



A well-formed formula in language L is:

- An attribute ti:vi
- a propositional composition of formulas with $\Lambda V \rightarrow \neg$

We are particularly interested in a subset of propositional formulas like

 $ti:vi \rightarrow ti:vi$


Which represent a claim. E.g.

name:"John Doe" → height:178

pub_key:3f3dhc7css8b2323fe \rightarrow degree:MscEng

pub_key:3f3dhc7css8b2323fe \rightarrow DID:"DID:ebsi:1234"





pub_key:3f3dhc73fe → degree:MscEng degree:MscEng → jobLevel:C

pub_key:3f3dhc73fe \rightarrow jobLevel:C



We can sketch a model: $M = (I, U, \sigma)$

- $I = \{ i_1, \dots, i_r \}$ intended to represent a set of individuals
- $U = \mathcal{O}(I) (U \text{ is the set of parts of } I)$
- σ : Att \rightarrow U is a function which maps each atomic term of the language $t_i : v_j$ to an element of U

We extend σ to the entire language $\sigma: \bot \rightarrow U$

 $\sigma(\neg A) = \overline{\sigma(\neg A)} \quad (\text{complement in I})$ $\sigma(A \land B) = \sigma(A) \cap \sigma(A)$ $\sigma(A \lor B) = \sigma(A) \lor \sigma(A)$ $\sigma(A \rightarrow B) = \overline{\sigma(A)} \lor \sigma(B)$

And we eventually define $M \models A$ iff $\sigma(A) = I$

Specifically, model M satisfies the claim

 $t_i: v_j \rightarrow t_h: v_k$

iff the set of individuals who hold the first attribute is a subset of the set of individuals who hold the second attribute



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A formula is:

• a claim c(a1, a2, a3)

• a trust relation t(a1, a2) -

• a propositional composition of formulas with $\land \lor \rightarrow \neg$

entity described by a1 (likely, a singling out attribute) claims that whichever entity is associated to a2 is also associated to a3

c(id:universityOfPadova pub_key:3f3dhc7css8b2323fe, degree:MscEng) c(id:trustedCA#1234 pub_key:3f3dhc7css8b2323fe, DID:"DID:ebsi:1234")

entity described by a1 (likely, a singling out attribute) trusts entity described by a2 (likely, a singling out attribute)

t(pub_key:3f3dhc7css8b2323fe, id:universityOfPadova)



Example:

t(luca, unipd)∧ t(luca, CA1) ∧ c(CA1, marco, DID1) ∧ c(unipd, DID1, degreeMSc)

 \rightarrow c(luca, marco, degreeMSc)

t(unipdAdmin, unipd) ∧ c(unipd, unipdBachelor, unipdStudent) ∧ c(unipd, marco, unipdBachelor)

→ c(unipdAdmin, marco, unipdStudent)



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




- Practically, to verify Alice's attributes:
 - 1. get one or more confirmation means (a picture from a scanner, a public key provided by Alice...)
 - 2. verify the binding between Alice and a confirmation mean(s) (controls: is/has/knows)
 - 3. get a set of bindings of which at least one starts from a confirmation mean (from any sources)
 - 4. verify each binding using the respective validation information
 - 5. follow the chain of bindings starting from a confirmation mean to the desired attributes.

NOTE1: bindings need not come from Alice. The source of bindings is irrelevant, as long as they are verifiable, i.e. there is a proof for them which can convince the verifier.

NOTE2: the verifier may be interested in getting information about some other subject (not necessarily someone interacting with it). No confirmation mean validation, only follow points 3, 4, 5.





- We advocate for the necessity of clarifying the semantics of digital credentials
- We offer a sketch of a formal calculus, based on attributes instead of entities
- The model does not require credentials to be bound to a holder
- The model only relies on **«atomic» credentials**, no need for selective disclosure
- We believe it might contribute to our design of digital identity schemas
- Though, it is just a sketch leaving out many important aspects...



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