



# User behaviour analysis for Malware detection

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# Introduction

Part I





### Increase in cyberattacks

Malware attacks increased 358% compared to 2019  
68% of the companies experienced a targeted attack on their networks



### Current techniques

Current techniques for malware detection are limited

## Dynamic analysis

- Detected by malware
- Change behaviour
- Computer resources needed
- Not immediate
- Not detect until executed
- No specific solution for servers
- Malware-centric

## Static analysis

- Malware signatures change
- Packed/Obfuscated
- Can't detect zero days
- No specific solution for servers
- Malware-centric

### User-centric

Detect deviation from normal user behaviour

### Efficient

Does not involve a dedicated infrastructure for malware analysis

### Quick detection

Metrics extracted every few seconds



### Zero-days

Detect any deviation

### Servers

Adapt to any host

### Lightweight


Models are quickly trained + fast prediction



# Architecture

Part II









## Machine learning

Relationships among features

Can handle noise

Adapt to changes



## No supervised training

We propose a system able to adapt without previous supervised learning process



# Model & Scenario

Part III



## Metrics

### Network

- Geographical connection origin
- Data Traffic Ratio
- Data Transfer Rate
- Packet Ratio
- Packet Transfer Rate
- Connection Status/Count

26

### Processes

- Process count

3

### System audit

- File Operations
- Command ratio


5

### CPU/Memory


- Cpu usage
- Memory usage

15

## Normal behaviour data



## Test data



## Algorithms

~~One-class SVM~~

~~Local Outlier Factor~~

Kernel Density Estimation

Autoencoder

## Kernel Density Estimation

### Parameters

**kernel** → Gaussian

**bandwidth** → Scott

**threshold** → 7th prc.

### Issues

Wrong feature importance

Issues detecting botnet and ransomware

## Autoencoders

### Layers

**input**→Shape of the training data

**encoding**→49 n, ReLU activation, L1 regularization

**decoding**→49 n ReLU

**output**→sigmoid function

### Issues

Poor feature importance

Issues detecting ransomware






# Results


Part IV



## Kernel Density Estimation




# Autoencoder



|                         | One-Class SVM | LOF  | Autoencoder | KDE  |
|-------------------------|---------------|------|-------------|------|
| <b>Normal behaviour</b> | 0.9           | 0.92 | 1           | 1    |
| <b>Botnet</b>           | 1             | 1    | 1           | 0.9  |
| <b>DoS</b>              | 1             | 0.96 | 1           | 1    |
| <b>Ransomware</b>       | 1             | 0.5  | 0.71        | 0.42 |

**Further training the system:**  
Introducing software compilation and backup data

|                         | One-Class SVM | LOF  | Autoencoder | KDE  |
|-------------------------|---------------|------|-------------|------|
| <b>Normal behaviour</b> | 0.81          | 0.95 | 1           | 1    |
| <b>Botnet</b>           | 1             | 1    | 1           | 1    |
| <b>DoS</b>              | 1             | 0.96 | 1           | 1    |
| <b>Ransomware</b>       | 0.93          | 0.28 | 0.78        | 0.35 |






# Next Steps / Conclusions

Part V







# THANKS

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QUESTIONS?