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An Opportunity-Based Approach to Information Security Risk

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- •Finding/Motivation
- Research questions
- Method
- Results
- •Sample case
- Conclusion

Finding/Motivation





- 1. How should practitioners interpret the concept of risk as defined in ISO/IEC 27005:2022 to make it more applicable to both positive and negative risks?
- 2. What should a definition of positive risk be articulated?
- 3. How can the definition of risk be applied to describe and assess both positive and negative risks?





Systematic literature review

Grounded theory

Coding and sorting

Categorisation and axial coding

Results – 1. How should practitioners interpret the concept of risk as defined in ISO/IEC 27005:2022 to make it more applicable to both positive and negative risks? RISK

1. Tier

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The effect of uncertainty on objectives (ISO/IEC 27005:2022)

2. Tier

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"An information security risk is a possible securityrelated event that could affect business objectives."

Risk is the potential that a given threat will <u>3. Tier</u> exploit vulnerabilities of assets and thereby cause harm to the organization (ISO/IEC 27005:2018)



Results – 2. What should a definition of positive risk be articulated?



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Results – 3. How can the definition of risk be applied to <u>describe</u> and <u>assess</u> both positive and negative risks?

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 Table 2. Risk description strategies.

Alternative	Risk description alternatives		
1.	There is a possibility that <insert threat=""> could result in <insert loss=""></insert></insert>		
2.	There is a possibility that <insert threat=""> could result in <insert gain=""></insert></insert>		
3.	There is a possibility that <insert opportunity=""> could result in <insert loss=""></insert></insert>		
4.	There is a possibility that <insert opportunity=""> could result in <insert gain=""></insert></insert>		





Alternative	Risk description alternatives
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Results – 3.2 How to assess positive and negative risks?



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1.

|2.

3.

|4.

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Sample case – Emergency healthcare

•Purpose

- Doctors rely on advanced technology to perform emergency health care procedures
- Lately some technical issues
- Hired a risk analyst to get a better understanding of risk related to information security







The same system is installed locally on different equipments

Travel time: 30 minutes



Staff must be on-site to the fix issue







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RISK

UNCERTAINTY

EVENT

OBJECTIVE

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Ę Risk description alternative 2 Threat "There is a possibility that malware can be installed without detection, which would not cause any business disruption." Gain LIKELIHOOD HIGH here is a possibility that *"insert th<mark>reat</mark>* for MEDIUN that could "insert loss" THREATS LOW Who?: Security and IT staff VERY LOW MODERATE VERY LOW LOSS Likelihood: Very high, lack of monitoring tools VERY HIGH EIKELIHOOD for THREATS **Impact:** Medium, Experienced IRT team bility that *"insert threat* here is a p/

VERY LO

UNCERTAINTY OBJECTIVE EVENT Opportunity Loss Gain Table 2. Risk description strategies. Alternative Risk description alternatives There is a possibility that <insert threat> could result in <insert loss> There is a possibility that <insert threat> could result in <insert gain> There is a possibility that <insert opportunity> could result in <insert loss> There is a possibility that <insert opportunity> could result in <insert gain> There is a possibility that "insert po*rtunity"* that could *"insert gair* MODERATE MEDIUM GAIN There is a possibility that "insert uld "insert gain" portunity" that could "insert loss GAIN LOSS

RISK

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_IKELIHOOD

for THREATS

MEDIUN

LOW

VERY LOW

VERY HIG

EIKELIHOOD for THREATS

VERVIO

Risk description alternative 3

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Opportunity

"There is a possibility that acquiring updated infrastructure (centralised, monitoring capabilities) could cause business disruption."

Who?: All stakeholder who prefer solutions

Likelihood:Depends on aquisition and
project management skillsImpact:Depends on ICT architecture

skills and IRT

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Loss

Risk description alternative 4

"There is a possibility that acquiring updated infrastructure detection of faults in the system(centralised, monitoring capabilities) could reduce the workload of the IT and security staff, and give a more reliable system."

Gain

Who?: All stakeholder who prefer solutions

Likelihood: Depends on aquisition and project management skills Depends on ICT architecture skills and involvement of staff

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-Same solutions but different strategies

-Management of positive and negative risk

-Apply security measures to ensure residual risk is at an acceptable level

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Conclusion

Contributions

- Proposed an updated definiton of risk
- Proposed a new definiton of positive risk
- Conceptualisation of risk
- Risk decription strategies
- Four dimensional risk matrix
- •Future leaders might expect security professionals to manage positive risk
- •We need to adapt to a business-oriented approach!



Thank you for your attention!



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